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Achieving Clinical Equality in an Influenza  
Pandemic: Patent Realities 
Eileen M. Kane∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 A twenty-first century novel influenza A (H1N1) pandemic is 
currently unfolding, and the eventual scope of this public health cri-
sis is not clear.  In addition, ongoing surveillance of the avian in-
fluenza A (H5N1) virus reveals outbreaks of human-to-human trans-
mission of the virus with significant mortality.  Effective pandemic 
management depends on pharmaceutical intervention with two dif-
ferent clinical objectives: the generation of an immune response to 
specific viral strains (vaccination) and the reduction of viral replica-
tion in an infected individual (antiviral administration).  The ability 
to offer pharmaceutical interventions for a public health crisis de-
pends on three factors: development, capacity, and access.  Pharma-
ceutical measures must be developed, capacity must be established, 
and access must be ensured. 
This Article discusses the three nodes of patenting that influence 
the availability of pharmaceutical countermeasures in an influenza 
pandemic.  Identification of the causative influenza virus is the first 
step in pandemic management.  The virus and its RNA sequence are 
both knowledge assets and physical inputs required for vaccine de-
sign.  Vaccine development, therefore, will be influenced by any pa-
tents on the genetic sequences or proteins of the pandemic virus, as 
well as on novel methods for vaccine production, the actual vaccine, 
or adjuvant technology, all of which are relevant to the assembly of a 
working vaccine on short notice. Pharmaceutical treatment of in-
fluenza infection during a pandemic could also rely on the use of pa-
tented antiviral drugs whose efficacy may be revealed as the pandem-
ic unfolds.  Unlike vaccines, these are not generally developed de novo 
 
∗Eileen M. Kane, Ph.D., J.D., Professor, Penn State Dickinson School of Law.  A ver-
sion of this Article was presented at the Seton Hall Law Review Symposium: Preparing 
for a Pharmaceutical Response to Pandemic Influenza in October 2008.  The author 
thanks the Symposium editors for their invitation and the other symposium partici-
pants for helpful comments on this work. 
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for a pandemic, but their availability could be dependent on the ex-
ercise of patent rights by market incumbents. Patent rights could 
control capacity, which may determine access. 
Pandemic planning must consider how patenting can influence 
development, capacity, and access to pharmaceutical interventions.  
National and international public health authorities are slowly inte-
grating intellectual property considerations into pandemic planning.  
Further integration will anticipate the emergence of patent claims, 
identify any relevant patents, encourage access norms, and consider 
the use of legal mechanisms that could alleviate patent-mediated ob-
stacles to the availability of critical products and methods that may be 
patented. 
This Article will discuss the patent nodes relevant to vaccine de-
velopment and to antiviral distribution during a global influenza 
pandemic, identify where such patents may facilitate or inhibit the 
availability of pharmaceutical countermeasures, and offer preliminary 
observations on the currently emerging novel H1N1 pandemic.  The 
goal of international clinical equality is essential for the eradication 
of an influenza pandemic, and strategies for its achievement can also 
be applied to other diseases. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Viruses have coexisted with humans throughout history, either 
passively as biological background noise or as microbial enemies ca-
pable of causing both treatable and untreatable illnesses.  Public 
health menaces such as smallpox, yellow fever, measles, Ebola, HIV, 
and polio are the result of viral infections that spread through popu-
lations, with the attendant consequences of morbidity and mortality.1  
A striking feature of viral diseases is the contrast between the see-
mingly simple nature of the infectious agent and the magnitude of 
the disease toll that it exacts.2  For example, the HIV virus has nine 
genes3 and influenza virus has eight genes,4 both far fewer than the 
estimated 25,000 genes in the human genome.5  This apparent genet-
ic simplicity, however, does not minimize the difficulty of developing 
effective prevention and therapeutic strategies. 
 
 1  See MICHAEL B. A. OLDSTONE, VIRUSES, PLAGUES AND HISTORY 3–6 (1998). 
 2  Id. at 8 (noting that viruses are “nothing more than a speck of genetic materi-
al and a coat of protein molecules.”). 
 3  2 S.J. FLINT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF VIROLOGY 170 (3d ed. 2009). 
 4  1 id. at 512. 
 5 Int’l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Finishing the Euchromatic Se-
quence of the Human Genome, 431 NATURE 931 (2004). 
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Influenza virus has a significant impact on human health.  It is 
not only responsible for annual seasonal outbreaks and periodic 
pandemics, but it also draws the public health community into an 
ongoing relationship involving both manageability and crisis.  The 
nature of an influenza public health crisis is a function of virulence of 
the particular viral strain.6  An annual influenza season is characte-
rized by the global spread of a viral strain with a fairly predictable pat-
tern of disease and mortality, for which an annual vaccine is devel-
oped to contain the spread and lessen the burden of illness.7  
Nonetheless, it is estimated that approximately 36,000 deaths occur 
in the United States each year from seasonal influenza.8 
Occasionally, an influenza strain particularly lethal to humans 
develops, appearing first as an animal influenza strain that jumps to a 
human host, and then becoming capable of human to human trans-
mission.  Influenza is capable of causing a pandemic, which is a pub-
lic health crisis characterized by the following conditions: a new viral 
strain emerges to which humans have no immunity; the viral strain 
infects humans and causes illness; and sustained transmission occurs 
among humans.9  Several pandemics have occurred in the last cen-
tury.  In the 1918 influenza pandemic, an estimated 675,000 Ameri-
cans died as the result of an influenza virus with a relatively high mor-
tality rate of 2.5 percent.10 Later influenza pandemics occurred in 
both 1957 and 1968.11 
Influenza is a segmented RNA virus with its genome divided 
among eight segments.12  Influenza is classified into subtypes A, B, 
 
 6  Virulence is defined as the ability of a virus to cause disease, or pathogenesis. 1 
FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 40. 
 7 See generally ANTHONY E. FIORE ET AL., PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF INFLUENZA, 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
IMMUNIZATION PRACTICES (ACIP) (Aug. 8, 2008), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5707a1.htm. 
 8 Approximately 5–20 percent of the U.S. population is affected by seasonal in-
fluenza.  See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Key Facts About Seasonal In-
fluenza (Flu), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/keyfacts.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2009). 
 9 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Questions and Answers About Avian 
Influenza (Bird Flu) and Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/qa.htm (last visited June 29, 2009). 
 10 Jeffrey K. Taubenberger et al., Initial Genetic Characterization of the 
1918 “Spanish” Influenza Virus, 275 SCIENCE 1793, 1793 (1997). This mortality rate 
compares with the more common mortality rate of less than 0.1 percent in other in-
fluenza pandemics.  Id. 
 11  Richard J. Webby & Robert G. Webster, Are We Ready for Pandemic Influenza?, 
302 SCIENCE 1519, 1519 (2003). 
 12 1 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 511. 
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and C.13  Humans can be infected by all three, but subtype A occurs in 
both humans and animals, particularly in avian species.14  To date, at 
least 3,455 human and avian isolates have been completely se-
quenced.15  Influenza viruses are further classified into strains and 
clades, which are comprised of viruses sharing a common genetic 
structure.16  This organizational scheme allows epidemiologists to 
track the dissemination of viral strains around the world.  Humans 
can also be infected by swine influenza strains that originate in pigs, 
and in fact, pigs are thought to be an ideal “mixing vessel” for mul-
tiple influenza strains.17  These facts have important implications for 
the spread of influenza, as some viral strains that first appear in ani-
mals can jump to humans, a host range capability that defines in-
fluenza as a potential human pathogen with an animal reservoir.  
Such a virus is known as a zoonotic strain, capable of crossing the 
species barrier.18  The clinical impact can vary across species, as an in-
fluenza virus that causes mild disease in animals may cause more se-
vere illness in humans.19  The existence of an animal reservoir makes 
it unlikely that the virus can ever be completely eradicated as a poten-
tial human pathogen, in contrast to viruses such as smallpox and po-
lio, which lack an animal reservoir.20 
The traditional nomenclature for clinically significant influenza 
viruses identifies the virus by its subtype and by two specific viral 
genes that mediate the infectivity of the virus: the hemagglutinin 
(HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes.21  There are sixteen known 
types of HA antigens and nine known types of the NA antigens.22  
 
 13  Id. 
 14 See 2 id. at 347. 
 15  Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, The Influenza Genome Sequenc-
ing Project, http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/research/resources/mscs/Influenza (last 
visited June 29, 2009).  The sequence data is available from GenBank, an interna-
tional searchable online database maintained by the National Institutes of Health, 
National Center for Biotechnology Information, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov (last 
visited June 29, 2009). 
 16  Writing Comm. of the Second World Health Org. Consultation on Clinical 
Aspects of Human Infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus, Update on Avian 
Influenza A (H5N1) Infection in Humans, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 261, 262 (2008) [herei-
nafter Writing Committee]. 
 17 OLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 185. 
 18 1 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 4. 
 19 2 id. at 348. 
 20 OLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 185. 
 21 Ctr. for Infectious Disease Research & Policy, Novel H1N1 Influenza (Swine 
Flu), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/index.html 
(last visited July 19, 2009). 
 22 Id. 
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Hemagglutinin is a viral surface protein that can elicit the production 
of antibodies to the virus.23  The NA protein is an enzyme on the viral 
membrane that facilitates the entry of influenza virus into a cell.24  
The dominant influenza subtypes currently circulating as seasonal 
strains in humans are influenza A (H1N1) (“seasonal H1N1”), in-
fluenza A (H3N2), and influenza B (which occurs only in humans).25  
The genome of the influenza virus changes over time, leading to the 
phenomena of antigenic drift (minor changes) and antigenic shift 
(radical changes); the latter occurs due to reassortment of the genet-
ic segments of one or more viruses.26 
The possibility of human infection from an animal influenza vi-
rus means that no host immune defense may be capable of respond-
ing to and neutralizing an infection.  Humans will be immunological-
ly naïve to a viral strain with a novel HA protein and this clinical 
limitation can explain how an influenza virus evades host responses 
and causes disease. 
This Article addresses the pharmaceutical interventions for an 
influenza pandemic in the context of patent-related biomedical re-
search.27  It presents an initial overview of the pharmaceutical options 
available for an influenza pandemic, followed by a description of the 
official U.S. and international strategies to contain a pandemic.  This 
Article also identifies nodes where patenting could intersect with 
scientific research and public health planning and discusses patent-
related obstacles that could impede the effectiveness of some public 
health efforts, as well as the strategies that might alleviate those ob-
stacles.  Much is theoretically known about the influenza virus, but 
the very nature of a pandemic is that a novel virus emerges that must 
be deciphered before a containment strategy can be devised.  A 
chronological sequence of knowledge points can be identified that 
map what we must know in order to properly prepare for a pandem-
ic: how the scientific community obtains the necessary genetic and 
biochemical knowledge about an emerging virus to design therapeu-
tics; how adequate production of these agents occurs; and how the 
general population gets access to these treatments.  Patents may sur-
 
 23 Writing Committee, supra note 16, at 263. 
 24 2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 296. 
 25 FIORE ET AL., supra note 7, at 9. 
 26 2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 141. 
 27  “Pharmaceutical interventions are the primary methods used to prevent the 
spread of disease as well as to reduce morbidity and mortality caused by the influenza 
virus.”  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: HHS NEEDS TO 
CONTINUE ITS ACTIONS  AND FINALIZE GUIDANCE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS  
9 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08671.pdf. 
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face at any of these planning benchmarks, and while they may stimu-
late investment in research, they can also become bottlenecks to the 
widespread availability of knowledge or products necessary for pan-
demic management.  Effective management of a pandemic, there-
fore, will turn on the development of both scientific and logistical 
knowledge in order to merge research insights with an appropriate 
legal infrastructure. 
The patenting that may affect pandemic planning emerges from 
a nationally based intellectual property regime.  A U.S. patent is a 
grant of rights to the first inventor that gives her “the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering [to sell], or selling the inven-
tion.”28  The patent term is twenty years from the date of the patent 
application’s filing.29  Patentability turns on the satisfaction of criteria 
which can be conceptually divided into two groups: those that apply 
to the invention and those that concern the sufficiency of the patent 
application itself.  The invention itself must satisfy the requirements 
for patentable subject matter,30 utility,31 novelty,32 and nonobvious-
ness.33  The written patent document (the specification) must meet 
separate legal requirements for the adequacy of the disclosure itself.34  
The patent examination process that the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) conducts is intended to result in the grant 
of patents that have met all of these requirements, and the grant 
therefore enjoys a presumption of validity.35  Patents in other national 
legal regimes may be the product of similar legal requirements, but 
some customization occurs, although generally against the consensus 
requirements of the Treaty on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS), which launched international patent harmoniza-
tion efforts in 1994.36 
 
 28 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). 
 29 Id. § 154(a)(2). 
 30 Id. § 101.  A patent may be granted for a process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.  See id.  A drug compound is a composition of matter. 
 31 Id.  The invention must be useful, as defined by the inventor.  Id. 
 32 Id. § 102.  A patent is barred by any public disclosure of identical subject mat-
ter.  Id. 
 33 Id.  § 103.  An invention may not be patented if its subject matter would be ob-
vious to one of ordinary skill in the art.  Id. 
 34 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).  The patent document is required to have certain 
attributes pertaining to the actual description of the invention, including enable-
ment, written description, and best mode.  Id. 
 35 Id. § 282. 
 36 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]; see also infra notes 171–173 and accompanying text. 
KANE (FINAL EDIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/4/2010  10:25 AM 
2009] PATENT REALITIES 1143 
Pharmaceutical patents are a type of chemical patent, and pa-
tents may be multiply obtained for different aspects of an invention 
related to pharmaceutical interventions: drug compound, method of 
use, formulation, and production process.37  Drug compound patents 
cover the active ingredient in the pharmaceutical product, while a 
method of use patent can cover the use of the product to treat a spe-
cific condition.38  The potential for a pharmaceutical company to 
hold multiple patents related to a particular drug product can ensure 
a dominant position in the market.  Molecular patenting in the age of 
biotechnology also includes the possibility of patents on viral DNA, 
RNA, or proteins—essentially, patents on the architectural compo-
nents of the virus itself.39  These attempts at patenting can be ex-
pected whenever a new microorganism appears, particularly when it 
is the causative agent of a clinically significant disease such as the viral 
strain eliciting a virulent influenza.  Such patents are upstream in the 
research and development life cycle in the sense that they attach to 
the knowledge that could be essential for the development of actual 
downstream therapeutics.  As a result, this is a potential site of patent-
related obstacles to implementing the most effective responses to an 
identified pandemic outbreak. 
Patents are inextricably linked to the research and development 
of pharmaceuticals in modern biomedical research.40  Depending on 
the circumstances, patents may function to stimulate invention, but 
specific monopolistic behaviors may also limit access to the products 
of inventive activity.  A question to be addressed is whether the pre-
dicted outlines of a pandemic health crisis generate the kind of plan-
ning that anticipates patent-related issues among the myriad legal is-
sues that arise in pandemic management.41  Do patent-related barriers 
emerge in a pandemic despite careful planning by public health au-
thorities?  Can these be forecast and minimized? 
Recent influenza pandemic developments have occurred across 
two distinct virus outbreaks.  The avian influenza A (H5N1) virus, 
originating in Asia, has demonstrated limited spread to humans since 
 
 37 JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 38–39, 44–49 (2005). 
 38 Id. at 38–39, 44–45. 
 39 See Eileen M. Kane, DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707, 712, 
723 (2004). 
 40 See THOMAS, supra note 37, at 4 (describing the consensus view that the availa-
bility of patent rights contributes to investments in pharmaceutical research). 
 41 Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, 
and the Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 133–34 (2007) (including intellectual 
property issues among the myriad legal issues relevant to influenza pandemic man-
agement). 
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2005, albeit with some mortality.42  Most official influenza pandemic 
planning activities and documents to date have been targeted to the 
possible acceleration of H5N1 to a pandemic strain capable of wide-
spread human infection.43  In April 2009, as this Article was in prepa-
ration, a novel influenza A (H1N1) (“novel H1N1”) virus was identi-
fied as the agent of an outbreak of respiratory disease that first 
appeared in Mexico and quickly spread to the United States and oth-
er continents.44  This outbreak elicited a pandemic declaration from 
the World Health Organization (WHO), which raised its global alert 
to level six in June 2009.45 
Questions about the effective role of patents in the pharmaceut-
ical field often focus on whether patents stimulate the development 
of new drugs and whether patents inhibit access to new and existing 
drugs.  To these variables, the intermediate factor of capacity must be 
added when a health crisis involves infectious disease.  Capacity con-
cerns whether the kinetics of infectious disease might be controlled 
because appropriate pharmaceutical interventions have been pro-
duced and are available.  Capacity precedes access.  If access can be 
ensured, are the pharmaceuticals in ample supply for the magnitude 
of the health emergency?  Without capacity, access will not follow.  
Effective management of infectious disease is a race against time, as 
the goal of public health authorities is not only to treat the infected 
but also to prevent further outbreaks.46  Supplies and materials must 
therefore be ready when clinical need is identified, thus requiring 
advance preparation that estimates and prepares for worst-case scena-
rios. 
 
 42 See World Health Org., Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of 
Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Reported to WHO (Aug. 11, 2009), 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2009_08_11/
en/index.html.  The WHO reports a global total of 438 cases and 262 deaths attri-
butable to laboratory-confirmed H5N1 in the period from 2003–2009.  Id. 
 43 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 1–2 (analyzing govern-
ment efforts to plan for an H5N1 pandemic). 
 44 Jon Cohen & Martin Enserink, As Swine Flu Circles the Globe, Scientists Grapple 
with Basic Questions, 324 SCIENCE 572, 573 (2009). 
 45 Press Statement, WHO Director-General Dr. Margaret Chan, World Now at the 
Start of 2009 Influenza Pandemic (June 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase6_
20090611/en/index.html.  The alert level is an indicator of global spread of the vi-
rus, not the severity of the disease.  See World Health Org., Current WHO Phase of 
Pandemic Alert, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). 
 46 Gostin & Berkman, supra note 41, at 126. 
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In Part II, this Article discusses the current status of official pan-
demic planning for pharmaceutical interventions during an influenza 
pandemic.  Part III identifies the patent nodes that will intersect with 
pandemic planning and pharmaceutical countermeasures: patents 
pertaining to viruses, vaccines and antivirals.  Full access to these ma-
terials is critical to an effective pharmaceutical response during a 
pandemic.  Part IV concludes with observations regarding how each 
of these patent nodes present different patent-related issues and how 
comprehensive pandemic planning can integrate intellectual proper-
ty considerations in order to avoid patent-related obstacles during a 
public health emergency. 
II. PHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS AND PANDEMIC PLANNING 
The most significant pharmaceutical interventions that could be 
available in a viral pandemic are drawn from two distinct approaches: 
the administration of vaccines, which present a whole or partial virus 
to a potential host in order to generate an immune response that will 
be protective against a later infection, and the administration of anti-
viral medications, which are chemicals that interfere with viral repli-
cation.47  Although these two categories of pharmaceuticals comprise 
the bulk of influenza-targeted research, other categories of pharma-
ceutical interventions exist, such as the development of monoclonal 
antibodies which are administered to neutralize viral infection.48  
Nonetheless, the baseline preparations for a pandemic focus on the 
development and stockpiling of antivirals and vaccines.49  The loci of 
pandemic planning are public health authorities at the national and 
international level, most notably the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services (HHS) in the United States and the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO).50 
 
 47 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: EFFORTS UNDER WAY 
TO ADDRESS CONSTRAINTS ON USING ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINES TO FORESTALL A 
PANDEMIC 4 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0892.pdf. 
 48 See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Insts. Of Health, Researchers Find Quick Way to 
Make Human Monoclonal Antibodies Against Flu (Apr. 30, 2008), available at 
http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/newsreleases/2008/humanMonoclonal.htm; Jian-
hua Sui et al., Structural and Functional Bases for Broad-Spectrum Neutralization of Avian 
and Human Influenza A Viruses, 16 NATURE STRUCTURAL & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 265, 
270 (2009) (reporting the possible development of monoclonal antibodies which 
would neutralize many influenza A viral strains). 
 49 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 9–14. 
 50 See World Health Org., Pandemic Preparedness, http://www.who.int/csr/ 
disease/influenza/pandemic/en/ (last visited October 7, 2009); U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemicInfluenzaPlan.pdf. 
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Active medical management of an influenza outbreak can occur 
at two temporal stages: 1) prevention of a possible outbreak or limit-
ing further spread of a virulent viral strain, or 2) treatment of existing 
infections.  Public health planning for a possible pandemic includes 
both strategies. Successful responses will occur against a backdrop of 
monitoring and surveillance by public health authorities, as they con-
tinually assess the dynamic status of an ongoing pandemic threat. 
The recent outbreak of a novel H1N1 influenza occurred in the 
U.S. and Mexico.51  This episode displayed the sequence of know-
ledge that begins to appear regarding a possibly pandemic virus out-
break.  The viral strain is genetically typed and assessed for its suscep-
tibility to existing antiviral drugs.  Full genetic sequencing is also 
necessary, as early and public dissemination of viral genetic se-
quences is critical to establishing global diagnostic capabilities and 
initiating vaccine development. 
To prepare an adequate response to the newly identified virus 
with pharmaceutical countermeasures, pandemic planners need to 
determine the scientific basis for identifying the most effective vac-
cine and antiviral medications, locate production capabilities, and 
achieve stockpiling and distribution mechanisms for these pharma-
ceuticals.  Next, this Article considers specific issues related to vac-
cines and antivirals. 
A. Vaccines 
Vaccines have been described as “the single most important 
pharmaceutical intervention during a pandemic.”52  To lead the effort 
to develop effective vaccines in a timely fashion, WHO has established 
the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN), which aggregates 
all the national influenza centers and the four WHO Collaborating 
Centers into a unified mechanism for the identification of novel in-
fluenza strains and consensus decision making regarding vaccine de-
sign.53  The occurrence of seasonal influenza demands that an annual 
vaccine composition be designed to reflect adequately the current 
antigenic status of the prevailing virus.  The annual recommenda-
tions for the composition of the seasonal vaccine are set forth by 
 
 51 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Swine Influenza A (H1N1) Infection in 
Two Children – Southern California, March-April 2009, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 400, 400 (Apr. 21, 2009);  Cohen & Enserink, supra note 44, at 573. 
 52 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 2. 
 53 World Health Org., WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network, 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/surveillance/en/ (last visited June 29, 
2009). 
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GISN.54  For example, the vaccine for the U.S. 2008–2009 influenza 
season was a trivalent composition composed of three circulating 
strains, designed to protect against the most likely sources of illness.55 
Formal pandemic planning has considered vaccine development 
on two fronts: a pre-pandemic vaccine, based on circulating viral 
strains with pandemic potential and developed before such a pan-
demic, and the actual pandemic vaccines, developed from the virus 
identified as the source of a pandemic outbreak.56  In theory, pre-
pandemic vaccine elicits some limited protective immunity and may 
be considered a “priming” action.  The U.S. government has created 
a stockpile of H5N1 pre-pandemic vaccine approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA).57 
A vaccine—whether seasonal, pre-pandemic, or pandemic—can 
be composed of a virus protein, known as an antigen, such as the HA 
protein, or it may be composed of a whole but weakened virus.  Offi-
cial U.S. pandemic planning calls for the production of 600 million 
doses of pandemic vaccine, enough for a population of 300 million to 
receive two doses each.58  A key question in vaccine design is whether 
antigen-sparing techniques, such as the use of adjuvants, will allow for 
a reduced antigenic component of the vaccine.59 
The limitation on vaccine manufacturing capabilities in the U.S. 
and globally represents a persistent source of concern.  Several fac-
tors are responsible for this limitation.  There have been technical 
limitations in the methods used to grow virus stock, which traditional-
ly has relied on the use of chicken eggs.60  With this factor and other 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 The U.S. vaccine against seasonal influenza is constituted of the following: In-
fluenza A/Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1)-like virus; an A/Brisbane/10/2007 (H3N2)-
like virus; a B/Florida/4/2006-like virus.  See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Influenza 
Virus Vaccine for the 2008–2009 Season, http://www.fda.gov/ 
BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Post-
MarketActivities/LotReleases/UCM062930 (last visited June 29, 2009). 
 56 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 24–25. 
 57 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC PLANNING: UPDATE VI, at 2 
(2009), available at http://www.kcercoalition.com/pdf/panflureport6.pdf.  The de-
velopment of a pre-pandemic vaccine can only occur for a viral strain which is identi-
fied as the source of a possible pandemic early enough to allow for development; this 
fact distinguishes the H5N1 situation from the ongoing A(H1N1) pandemic, which 
has emerged too quickly into full pandemic to allow for pre-pandemic vaccines to be 
developed.  See Jon Cohen & Martin Enserink, After Delays, WHO Agrees: The 2009 
Pandemic Has Begun, 324 SCIENCE 1496, 1496 (2009). 
 58 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 27. 
 59 Id. at 61; see also 2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 271. 
 60 Catherine J. Luke & Kanata Subharao, Vaccines for Pandemic Influenza, 12 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 66, 69–70 (2006). 
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realities of the production process, the time required to produce an 
effective vaccine from the time that a pandemic virus is isolated has 
been estimated to be four to six months.61  A further complication to 
vaccine production is that only a small group of companies with 
manufacturing capability exist.62  Finally, the production of a pan-
demic vaccine must be incorporated into the ongoing demand sche-
dule for the production of a seasonal influenza vaccine.  An initial 
concern in the unfolding novel H1N1 pandemic has been whether to 
include a pandemic vaccine component in the seasonal influenza 
vaccine or to instead manufacture it separately.63  Both vaccines de-
pend on the same manufacturing expertise and infrastructure.64 
The U.S. has established the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), 
which is a publicly-funded repository of materials required for emer-
gency and public health crises, including pharmaceutical supplies 
that are ordered and purchased from commercial manufacturers.65  
This reservoir of public health supplies exists to augment local public 
health efforts.  Pharmaceutical supplies are distributed from the SNS 
within twelve hours to requesting states, and all supplies are free to 
the public.66  International vaccine demand may be satisfied by the es-
tablishment of a WHO vaccine stockpile.67 
 
 61 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 26–27. 
 62 The FDA has identified five manufacturers that are able to supply the U.S. 
market with influenza vaccines.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Influenza Virus Vaccine, 
Trivalent, Types A and B, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/ 
ApprovedProducts/ucm094045.htm (last visited June 29, 2009). 
 63  Although the seasonal flu virus is an H1N1 virus, it does not cross-react with 
the existing pandemic H1N1, so the seasonal influenza vaccine will not provide any 
protection against the pandemic viral strain.  See Maryn McKenna, Path to Swine Flu 
Vaccine Has Major Hurdles, CIDRAP NEWS, May 1, 2009, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/ 
cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/news/may0109vaccine.html. 
 64 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 26–28. 
 65 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile (last visited June 29, 2009). 
 66 Id. 
 67 World Health Assembly [WHA], Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of In-
fluenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, at 104, Res. 60.28(2)(2) (May 
23, 2007), available at http://new.paho.org/hq/images/stories/AD/HSD/CD/ 
INFLUENZA/reso-60_28en.pdf.  The resolution calls for 
an international stockpile of vaccines for H5N1 or other influenza vi-
ruses of pandemic potential as appropriate, for use in countries in 
need in a timely manner and according to sound public-health prin-
ciples, with transparent rules and procedures, informed by expert 
guidance and evidence, for operation, prioritization, release of stocks, 
management and oversight. 
Id. 
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The availability of vaccines, therefore, will depend on a combi-
nation of scientific research and logistical infrastructure.  Further-
more, patents may bear on the availability of both materials and me-
thods necessary to the vaccine development process; this will be 
discussed in Part III. 
B. Antivirals 
Antiviral drugs are molecules which have been shown to inhibit 
the replication of a particular virus, making them particularly suitable 
for administration after an individual contracts a viral infection.68  
The modern era of antibiotics is familiar to many who have been 
treated for bacterial infections, but viral infections represent an en-
tirely different research challenge for scientists.  Because viruses must 
enter the cells of an infected host in order to replicate and spread, an 
antiviral drug must be developed to precisely target the virus without 
concomitantly destroying the host cell.  This is a difficult task.  The 
Food and Drug Administration has approved several classes of anti-
virals for influenza outbreaks.69  These drugs work by specifically tar-
geting one of the viral proteins and inhibiting the ability of the virus 
to replicate, thereby limiting infectious spread. 
One class of antivirals with effectiveness against influenza are the 
amantadines.70  These drugs target the influenza A M2 protein, which 
is found on the internal nuclear envelope of the virus.71  Amantadine 
and rimantadine are the most prominent examples of this class of 
pharmaceuticals.72 
A separate class of antivirals is targeted at the neuraminidase 
(NA) protein of the virus, the surface enzyme that must facilitate the 
entry of a virus into a cell.73  The NA protein is one of the two in-
fluenza proteins (along with HA) whose genetic evolution directly 
impacts which pharmaceutical interventions will be effective against a 
specific viral strain.74  The most prominent example of the drugs that 
 
 68  2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 279. 
 69 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Influenza (Flu) Antiviral Drugs and Related In-
formation, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ 
ucm100228.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2009) (“The anti-influenza antiviral drugs are 
not a substitute for a vaccine and are used only as an adjunct to vaccine in the con-
trol of influenza.”). 
 70  2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 280. 
 71  Id. at 291. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. at 296. 
 74  Id. 
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target NA is oseltamivir, popularly known as Tamiflu.75  The FDA first 
approved the drug in 1999 and it is manufactured in capsule form by 
Roche, Inc.76  A second drug in this class is zanamivir, sold under the 
name Relenza, manufactured and distributed by GlaxoSmithKline.77  
In contrast to Tamiflu, this drug must be inhaled.78 
The utility of preexisting antivirals in the treatment of novel viral 
disease is not guaranteed.  A number of variables interact to make an-
tiviral treatment uneven and ineffective.79  The most significant com-
plication is the emergence of antiviral-resistant strains of a virus, 
which have developed mutations making it possible for the virus to 
evade antiviral inhibition.80  Such resistance is always a possibility in 
the treatment of influenza and can account for treatment failures as 
an influenza outbreak proceeds. 
Authorities have already identified drug-resistant viral strains 
during the 2008–2009 seasonal influenza outbreaks.81  Such a muta-
tion can arise as the virus evolves against a backdrop of antiviral 
treatment, where advantageous mutations that allow the virus to 
avoid antiviral inhibition will be selected for and propagated.82  Epi-
demiological reports on the 2008–2009 influenza season suggest that 
as many as 98 percent of the seasonal H1N1 viruses circulating in the 
 
 75  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Overview: Tamiflu, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Searc
h.Overview&DrugName=TAMIFLU&CFID=21136746&CFTOKEN=f78ab56ebccbb50
6-30245DD4-1143-D1C5-FB6C4048A11F8F76 (last visited June 29, 2009). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves a Second Drug for the 
Prevention of Influenza A and B in Adults and Children (Mar. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm1086
22.htm. 
 78 Compare Relenza, Frequently Asked Questions About Relenza, 
http://www.relenza.com/relenza-faqs.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2009) (noting that 
Relenza is inhaled) with Tamiflu, Taking TAMIFLU, http://www.tamiflu.com/ 
taking/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2009) (noting that Tamiflu is taken orally in 
pill or liquid form). 
 79 2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 279–81. 
 80 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Influenza Antiviral Drug Resistance, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/antiviralresistance.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 
2009). 
 81 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Influenza Antiviral Resistance and 
Interim Recommendations for the Use of Influenza Antiviral Medications in the 
United States, http://www2c.cdc.gov/podcasts/player.asp?=f10652#transcript (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 82 Id. 
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U.S. have developed a mutation in the NA gene which renders Tamif-
lu ineffective against the protein, resulting in drug-resistant viruses.83 
Antiviral-resistant viruses seriously compromise the existing port-
folio of clinical responses, whether for the treatment of seasonal in-
fluenza or a pandemic influenza.  If the prevailing viral agent be-
comes resistant to a leading antiviral, the therapeutic options 
diminish, and effective responses will depend on the availability of 
vaccines that elicit an immune response from an infected individual. 
The relationship between seasonal and pandemic influenza 
strains is complicated; it is theoretically possible that a nascent pan-
demic viral strain can pick up mutations conferring drug resistance 
from a more benign seasonal influenza (by a reassortment process, 
described earlier).84  As a result, the new virus is simultaneously viru-
lent and less amenable to treatment.  Such a phenomenon is a re-
minder that advance planning for antiviral responses is necessary but 
may be limited by the emergence of a viral strain resistant to stock-
piled antivirals. 
Planning for an influenza pandemic includes the stockpiling of 
antiviral drugs.  HHS has announced its planning goal of stockpiling 
75 million doses of antivirals, adequate for treatment of about 25 
percent of the U.S. population.85  These drugs are collected in the 
SNS and additional drugs are maintained in state stockpiles.86 
The ability to use antivirals for containment of an influenza 
pandemic is dependent on having adequate stockpiles of antivirals 
assembled and within their shelf-life range.87  Research on the devel-
opment of new antivirals for most clinically significant viruses (in-
cluding influenza) continues over time.  Nevertheless, pandemic 
preparedness is likely to rely on those drugs with an established pro-
file in targeting influenza, most particularly the influenza subtype A 
that will be the likely source of any human pandemic outbreak be-
 
 83 Nila J. Dharan et al., Infections with Oseltamivir-Resistant Influenza A(H1N1) Virus 
in the United States, 301 JAMA 1034, 1034 (2009) (noting also that “influenza A[ 
](H1N1) accounted for 19 [percent] of circulating viruses in the United States”). 
 84 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 85 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 6, 54. 
 86 Id. at 19–20. 
 87 For example, manufactured Tamiflu capsules on sale in the European Union 
have a five-year period before expiration; recent guidance from the European Medi-
cines Agency suggests that these capsules may be used for an additional two years, if 
needed, in an influenza pandemic.  See Press Release, Eur. Med. Agency, European 
Medicines Agency Recommendations on Extension of Shelf Life for Tamiflu (May 8, 
2009), available at http://www.emea.europa.eu/humandocs/PDFs/EPAR/tamiflu/ 
28497109en.pdf. 
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cause of its animal reservoir.88  Thus, by the time a potential pandem-
ic is evident, effective planning will depend on antiviral capacity, not 
development.  This shifts attention to the mechanisms for manufac-
ture and procurement of existing drugs for the designated stockpiles.  
The government stockpiles will have been assembled to target critical 
first responders, including medical personnel, as well as selected 
groups of the most medically vulnerable.89  In view of the fact that the 
national stockpile has only targeted capacity for 25 percent of the 
population, HHS also recommends that private-sector antiviral stock-
piles be established for the treatment of other workers and communi-
ties not essential to the first pandemic response.90 
Patenting antiviral medications has implications for establishing 
full capacity in pandemic management, with further influence on ac-
tual access for individuals.  This will be discussed in Part III. 
III. PATENT NODES IN PANDEMIC MANAGEMENT 
A. Viruses 
The causative agent of an influenza pandemic must be deter-
mined by examining virus isolates recovered from one or more in-
fected individuals.  Viral stocks of such isolates are prepared by grow-
ing the virus in chicken eggs, the traditional method for preparing 
influenza virus stocks, or in cell culture, which relies on the availabili-
ty of a cell line that will allow the virus to replicate.91 
Isolation of the virus itself quickly leads to the goal of determin-
ing its genetic composition, namely, the RNA sequences of its genes.  
This research may generate potentially patentable materials, includ-
ing the viral nucleic acid gene sequences, the protein amino acid se-
quences, recombinant vectors that host the viral genes as DNA or 
RNA, and cell lines which carry the viral materials.92  Of course, the 
goal of obtaining the baseline genetic structure of the pandemic virus 
also allows for ongoing genetic detection of variants from this origi-
nal virus, an accounting of any regional variations, and a determina-
tion of the ancestry of a particular virus. 
 
 88 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 89  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 29. 
 90 Id. at 21. 
 91 Lance C. Jennings et al., Stockpiling Prepandemic Influenza Vaccines: A New Corner-
stone of Pandemic Preparedness Plans, 8 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 650, 654 (2008). 
 92  Ben Prickril, Advisor, Pub. Interest Intellectual Prop. Advisors, Patent Land-
scape of H5N1 Influenza Virus at Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors Sym-
posium (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/meetings/en/2008/ 
lifesciences/patent_landscaping/lss1_ge_08_prickril.pdf. 
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Public access to the genetic sequences of influenza A (H5N1) is 
available from several sources, all of which are dependent on the pro-
vision of virus sequences from host countries.  For example, the Na-
tional Center for Biotechnology Information maintains an influenza 
sequence database which collects the sequence data from the Nation-
al Institute of Allergy & Infectious Diseases (NIAID) Influenza Ge-
nome Sequencing Project and GenBank.93  An international consor-
tium known as the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data 
(GISAID) was launched in 2006 to gather influenza sequence data, 
thus recognizing the need to establish consensus databases that 
would allow open and rapid sharing of viral sequences.94  The guide-
lines for use of the database note the historical aversion to patenting 
by influenza virus researchers for reasons related to the nature of in-
fluenza management as well as scientific norms.95  Nonetheless, re-
searchers at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
filed a patent application advancing claims to protein sequences of 
the H5N1 virus in 2008.96  In an effort to document the patent land-
scape of the field, the WHO has undertaken a project to map where 
patents have been sought on any of the relevant H5N1 viral mate-
 
 93 Yiming Bao et al., The Influenza Virus Resource at the National Center for Biotechnol-
ogy Information, 82 J. VIROLOGY 596, 596 (2008). 
 94 Peter Bogner et al., A Global Initiative On Sharing Avian Flu Data, 442 NATURE 
981, 981 (2006). 
Scientists participating in the GISAID consortium would agree to share 
their sequence data, to analyze the findings jointly, and to publish the 
results collaboratively. Data would be deposited in the three publicly 
available databases participating in the International Sequence Data-
base Collaboration (EMBL, DDBJ and GenBank) as soon as possible af-
ter analysis and validation, with a maximum delay of six months. 
Id. 
 95 GISAID Platform, http://platform.gisaid.org (last visited June 29, 2009). 
Influenza viruses have not been subject to intellectual property rights 
historically. This tradition has been important because the required 
changes in influenza viruses contained in human influenza virus vac-
cines to match those viruses circulating currently in the field must oc-
cur at a speed far in excess of the legal process associated with the at-
tainment of commercial protection. In order to allow rapid 
development of products such as vaccines and other interventions on 
an equitable basis by all countries and other interested parties, the 
convention has been for human health professionals to share virus spe-
cimens and data openly without creating barriers of exclusivity such as 
the filing of patents. 
Id.  Indonesia resumed supplying virus sequences to this database in 2008.  Id. 
 96 Avian Influenza Vaccine, European Patent No. WO/2008/112017 (filed Sept. 
18, 2008). 
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rials.97  This research demonstrates that a small cluster of patent ap-
plications have been filed on various sequences and proteins of H5N1 
and several patents have been issued, but the report further notes 
that patent landscaping must continue as the field matures.98  The se-
quence of the H5N1 and novel H1N1 influenza viruses have been de-
termined.99  The WHO provided notice that genetic sequences from 
one novel H1N1 virus isolate were available on the GISAID database 
within several days of the first reports of the outbreak.100 
Some national public health authorities are concerned that their 
public disclosure of regional virus isolates could lead to patents on 
the viral genetic sequences that will impede vaccine design or limit 
effective access to vaccines directed at the pandemic influenza strain.  
A specific controversy over the prospective patenting of influenza se-
quences provided to international public health agencies occurred 
with H5N1 in 2006, when Indonesia stopped providing virus isolates 
from infected individuals to international authorities.101  The Indone-
sian authorities based their action in part on the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity (CBD), which provides that countries are entitled to 
benefit from the use of their genetic resources, and which the Indo-
nesian authorities interpreted to include virus isolates from local 
populations.102  That interpretation, however, has been challenged.103 
The appearance of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
in southern China in 2003104 presented the world with a potentially 
 
 97 Prickril, supra note 92, at 15–18.  The project focuses on patents bearing on 
the actual H5N1 virus, rather than on auxiliary methods and materials.  Id. 
 98 Id. at 18. 
 99 Rebecca J. Garten et al., Antigenic and Genetic Characteristics of Swine-Origin 2009 
(H1N1) Influenza Viruses Circulating in Humans, 325 SCIENCE 197, 197 (2009); Kanta 
Subbarao et al., Characterization of an Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus Isolated from a 
Child with a Fatal Respiratory Illness, 279 SCIENCE 393, 394–95 (1998). 
 100 WORLD HEALTH ORG., VIRAL GENE SEQUENCES TO ASSIST UPDATE DIAGNOSTICS 
FOR SWINE INFLUENZA  A(H1N1) 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.euro.who.int/ 
Document/INF/viral_sequ_25Apr09.pdf.  The WHO published the gene sequences 
of the viral isolate A/California/04/2009 A(H1N1).  Id at 2.  The document listed 
the sequences of the major viral proteins, including the clinically important antigen-
ic proteins, HA and NA.  Id. at 1–2. 
 101 David P. Fidler, Influenza Virus Samples, International Law, and Global Health Dip-
lomacy, 14 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 88, 88–90 (2008). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 90–92 (stating that influenza viruses are not the kind of native genetic 
resources contemplated by the CBD); see also Richard Holbrooke & Laurie Garrett, 
‘Sovereignty’ That Risks Global Health, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2008, at B7. 
 104 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome – Worldwide 2003, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 226, 226 ( 2003).  
The syndrome was named by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and a virus was 
suspected as the causative agent.  Id. at 227–28. 
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lethal disease that was ultimately traced to a viral agent, namely, a co-
ronavirus.105  As scientists raced to identify and decipher the virus, the 
question of patent rights in the actual viral genes and in therapeutic 
pharmaceuticals complicated the coherence of an international pub-
lic health strategy to contain the epidemic.106  Three separate groups 
of international researchers filed U.S. patent applications on the 
DNA sequences of the virus.107  The U.S. group of researchers, based 
at the CDC, ultimately received a patent to the DNA sequence that 
they identified for the virus.108 
In the SARS crisis, the race to identify the novel pathogenic virus 
was complicated by the accompanying patent-seeking on the DNA se-
quences for the pathogen.  International public health authorities 
expressed concerns over the possibility that patent rights would inter-
fere with the sharing of critical viral genetic sequences.109  The WHO 
issued a policy statement that identified the nascent patent conflicts 
over the SARS virus as a potential source of concern regarding the in-
tegrity of international cooperation and patient access to clinical 
treatments.110  This WHO action served as a precursor to its later ef-
forts to encourage the sharing of influenza H5N1 virus sequences.111  
 
 105 Matthew Rimmer, The Race to Patent the SARS Virus: The TRIPS Agreement and 
Access to Essential Medicines, 5 MELB. J. INT’L L. 335, 336 (2004). 
 106 Id. at 337–39. 
 107 Id. at 339–51. 
 108 U.S. Patent No. 7,220,852 (filed April 12, 2004).  “We claim 1: An isolated 
nucleic acid molecule consisting of the nucleotide sequences as set forth in SEQ ID 
NO. 1.”  Id.  The patent recites a DNA sequence of approximately 30,000 bases.  Id. 
 109 Rimmer, supra note 105, at 372–74. 
 110 World Health Org., Patent Applications for SARS Virus and Genes (Mar. 29, 
2003), http://www.who.int/ethics/topics/sars_patents/en/ (last visited Nov. 5, 
2009). 
     WHO intends to monitor the effects of patents (and patent applica-
tions) on the speed with which SARS diagnostic tests, treatments, and 
vaccines are developed and made available for use and on the manner 
in which prices are set for these technologies. 
 
     In the longer term, the manner in which SARS patent rights are 
pursued could have a profound effect on the willingness of researchers 
and public health officials to collaborate regarding future outbreaks of 
new infectious diseases. WHO will therefore examine whether the 
terms of reference for such collaborations need to be modified to en-
sure that the credit for any intellectual property developed is appro-
priately attributed, that revenues derived from licensing such property 
are devoted to suitable uses, and that legitimate rewards for innovative 
efforts do not impose undue burdens on efforts to make tests, thera-
pies, and preventive measure available to all. 
Id. 
 111 WHA, supra note 67, at 2. 
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Overtones of national secrecy also shadowed the management of the 
SARS outbreaks; the reluctance of China to inform public health au-
thorities of the magnitude of the crisis was severely criticized.112  In 
hindsight, the SARS crisis demonstrates that secrecy can result from 
deliberate official concealment, but that the prospective patenting of 
critical medical information can result in effective secrecy if it retards 
the international sharing of virus sequences. 
The SARS crisis appears to have launched recent formal efforts 
by the WHO to integrate patent issues into its leadership activities re-
garding global health.  The WHO established the Intergovernmental 
Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Prop-
erty in 2008 to develop a plan for increasing the integration of patent 
issues into global health planning.113 
The influenza viruses are both knowledge tools and physical in-
puts.  Access to the virus and its sequence is not necessary only for 
vaccine design.  Global monitoring of a pre-pandemic or pandemic 
virus is necessary for a number of reasons: to trace the ancestry of the 
originating virus, to conduct epidemiological surveillance, to map re-
gional virus variations, and to identify the antiviral susceptibility or 
resistance of a particular virus strain.  Thus, full and equitable access 
to influenza viruses of interest is the critical foundation for under-
standing and managing the scope of an influenza pandemic and for 
ongoing research.  While patent law does not prohibit patenting iso-
lated viruses and DNA or protein sequences per se, professional norms 
that minimize patent-seeking on influenza viruses will enhance global 
access to the viruses as research tools and will also remove any disin-
centives for public health authorities to fully cooperate in the infor-
mation-sharing efforts that underlie pandemic management. 
B. Vaccines 
Effective vaccination of a population during an influenza pan-
demic awaits the identification of the causative agent necessary to 
construct an effective vaccine.  Authorities estimate the time frame 
needed to design and manufacture a true pandemic vaccine to be at 
 
 112 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ASIAN SARS OUTBREAK CHALLENGED 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL RESPONSES 15 (2004). 
 113 WHA, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellec-
tual Property, at 1–3, Res. 61.21 (May 24, 2008), available at 
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf. 
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least five to six months from the declaration of a pandemic.114  Patents 
with potential relevance to vaccine production include patents to vir-
al genetic sequences that are necessary for specific vaccine design, 
described in Part III.A, patents that pertain to specific technological 
processes required for the manufacture of such vaccines, patents on 
non-viral vaccine components, and patents on unique vaccine com-
positions. 
Generally, vaccines that utilize the virus as an antigen can be 
constructed by employing either the natural reassortment process in 
which two or more viruses exchange segments to create a reassortant, 
or through reverse genetics techniques from biotechnology.115  In re-
verse genetics, the desired viral segments are built into DNA plasmids 
and are introduced into cells for the purpose of creating a novel virus 
with the designated genetic composition. 116  Patents are held on the 
critical technologies of reverse genetics, including the use of several 
methodologies, such as the 8-plasmid system under patent to Me-
dImmune, Inc., and the 12-plasmid system under patent to Mount 
Sinai Medical Center.117  Over the last several years, MedImmune has 
solidified its dominant patent position in the field of reverse genetics 
methods by licensing a number of patents in the field from various 
sources.118 
 
 114 See World Health Org., Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Manufacturing Process 
and Timeline, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/ 
h1n1_vaccine_20090806/en/index.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2009). 
 115  Luke & Subharao, supra note 60, at 69–70. 
 116  Id. 
 117 David S. Fedson, Preparing for Pandemic Vaccination: An International Policy Agen-
da for Vaccine Development, 26 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 19 (2005) (noting how critical vac-
cine method patents are to vaccine development).  For an example of a critical pa-
tent on a reverse genetic method, see Helper-Free Rescue of Recombinant Negative 
Strand RNA Virus, U.S. Patent No. 6,649,372 (filed Nov. 28, 2000). 
 118 Press Release, MedImmune, MedImmune Expands Patent Estate for Reverse 
Genetics with New Rights from Mount Sinai School of Medicine (Dec. 7, 2005), 
available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=83037&p=irol-newsArticle 
(noting that the portfolio includes U.S. Patent Nos. 6,544,785 and 6,649,372). 
With this license, MedImmune has further strengthened its patent es-
tate to now either own or have exclusive licenses to all of the key intel-
lectual property (listed below) for this technology: 
     Mount Sinai School of Medicine Plasmid Rescue Portfolio (WO 
01/04333) 
     MedImmune Fundamental Reverse Genetics Portfolio (WO 
91/03552) 
     Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Plasmid Rescue Portfolio 
(WO 00/60050) 
     St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital Dual Promoter Plasmid Res-
cue Portfolio (WO 01/83794). 
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The actual vaccine itself is not only an output from the research 
and clinical processes but it may also be the subject of a patent.  In 
addition to the possible patenting of viral genes and proteins, de-
scribed in Part III.A, the use of those molecules in the creation of a 
vaccine with a specific pharmaceutical formulation can lead to a nov-
el composition.  Thus, the actual pharmaceutical needed to vaccinate 
the target population may be a patented product, as illustrated by the 
patents on seasonal influenza vaccines.119 
Patents that are auxiliary to the actual viral antigen or virus may 
play as dominant a role in vaccine development as any actually sought 
on the virus components themselves.  For example, the use of non-
viral chemicals that augment the immunogenicity of a vaccine—
known as adjuvants—is critical.120  Such compounds allow a vaccine to 
include less actual antigen or virus, and thus allow for dose-sparing 
clinical approaches that maximize the utility of the available viral 
components.121  These compounds can be patented in isolation and 
can also appear in patents that claim a vaccine as a specific combina-
tion of antigen and adjuvant. 
Patent disputes can also be avoided by advance integration of 
stakeholders into the patent-seeking process; such a model has oc-
curred through the designation of joint patent ownership among 
academic and funding partners in the development of an AIDS vac-
cine.122  The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative has incorporated 
the use of access-enhancing mechanisms into the patent licensing of 
research that it has sponsored.  Commercial licensing partners must 
stipulate to “access commitments” that facilitate widespread availabil-
ity and agree to provide capacity levels and access.123  This model 
 
Id. 
 119 For an example, see Influenza Hemagglutinin and Neuraminidase Variants, 
U.S. Patent No. 7,504,109 (filed May 20, 2005), which was assigned to MedImmune 
LLC and contains product and method claims pertaining to FluMist, a seasonal vac-
cine manufactured by MedImmune LLC. 
 120 2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 271. 
 121 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 27 n.62 (noting the 
conservation of antigen achieved by using adjuvants in vaccine production). 
 122 HIV Vaccines: Patents for First AIDS Vaccine Specifically Designed for Africa Will Be 
Jointly Owned, AIDS WKLY., Sept. 10, 2001, at 19, 19 (noting agreement among the 
University of Nairobi, Kenya, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, and the Med-
ical Research Council, which removed patent-mediated obstacles to the testing of a 
vaccine against an Africa-specific HIV virus). 
 123 INT’L AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE, PROMOTING INNOVATION AND ACCESS THROUGH 
EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.iavi.org/Lists/IAVIPublications/attachments/1238/IAVI_Promoting_In
novation_and_Access_through_Effective_Management_of_Intellectual_Property_ 
2007_ENG.pdf.  “These commitments provide that any vaccine will be promptly reg-
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could be followed for HHS-sponsored research aimed at designing 
improved methods for vaccine production.124 
There is precedent for incorporating access-enhancing mechan-
isms into government-funded programs that aim to combat infectious 
disease outbreaks.  The swine flu health crisis of 1976 emerged fol-
lowing the appearance of a virulent in the United States.125  An initial 
outbreak at the Fort Dix military base was interpreted as an initial 
event in a likely cascade of epidemic disease.126  Public health experts 
advocated for the establishment of a national vaccine program.127  
The U.S. government recruited the leading vaccine manufacturers to 
the production of national stockpiles and legislation prohibited 
pharmaceutical manufacturers from making a profit from swine flu 
vaccines.128 
Unlike most pharmaceuticals, the development of a pandemic 
vaccine is likely to be initiated through a unique and coordinated se-
quence of events: public health authorities’ identification of a con-
sensus virus for vaccine development, followed by vaccine design and 
clinical testing, and then official purchasing by national governments 
from commercial manufacturers to build stockpile capacity.  Thus, 
the development and capacity levels of vaccine resources are largely 
initiated and designed by public health authorities.  As a corollary, 
access from these stockpiles is a function of official distribution, not 
consumer purchase.  Nevertheless, patented compounds or methods 
required for vaccine production must be purchased or licensed by 
public health authorities from commercial entities who may hold pa-
tents to any of these items.  The willingness to license or the licensing 
terms may reflect the patent-related considerations that enter the 
transactional evaluation.  Patents could affect licensing negotiations 
through pricing mechanisms or limited offerings.  In a public health 
emergency, such as an influenza pandemic, recourse to one of the 
patent-alleviating mechanisms available to governments is likely to 
ease any emergence of refusals to deal or unreasonable licensing 
terms.  These mechanisms are discussed in Part III.D. 
 
istered, manufactured in adequate quantities and distributed at reasonable prices in 
the developing world.”  Id. 
 124 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., HHS Announces Ad-
vanced Development Contract for New Way to Make Flu Vaccine (June 23, 2009), 
available at  http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/06/20090623c.html. 
 125 See LAURIE GARRETT, THE COMING PLAGUE: NEWLY EMERGING DISEASES IN A 
WORLD OUT OF BALANCE 153–92 (1994). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 167–73. 
 128 Id. at 173. 
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C. Antivirals 
A hallmark of pandemic preparedness is the strategy of building 
stocks of antiviral medications for the treatment of viral infection.129  
These compounds are chosen because of demonstrable success with 
previous viral outbreaks.130  A pandemic viral strain, however, is only 
identified after its clinical presentation; at that time, the effectiveness 
of existing antivirals in reducing pandemic spread will be deter-
mined.131  If viral resistance to an antiviral has developed, the antiviral 
stocks will not be effective and the clinical strategy of antiviral treat-
ment may not be possible.132 
The leading antivirals for use in an influenza pandemic are 
those that target the NA protein of the virus, namely Tamiflu and Re-
lenza, and these are the focus of stockpiling efforts.133  Tamiflu (osel-
tamivir phosphate) was developed and patented by Gilead Sciences, 
Inc., a California-based biotechnology company.134  The company 
then negotiated a Development and License Agreement for Tamiflu 
with Roche, Inc.135  Gilead sought to terminate that agreement in 
2005 due to several material breaches, including underpayment of 
royalties, as well as “Roche’s failure to use best efforts to commercial-
ize Tamiflu by adequately and sustainably promoting and marketing 
the product in all significant markets.”136  At the time, Gilead noted 
that “[e]nsuring that Tamiflu is made as widely available as possible is 
necessary for the protection of public health.”137  The two companies 
settled after arbitration began and established a joint committee “to 
oversee manufacturing, commercial[,] and pandemic planning for 
the product.”138 The pharmaceutical that the FDA approved has six 
 
 129 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 12–13. 
 130  See id. 
 131 See supra Part II.B. 
 132 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
 133 U. S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 18, 63. 
 134 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 75. 
 135 Press Release, Gilead Sciences Inc., Gilead Delivers Termination Notice to 
Roche for Tamiflu Development and Licensing Agreement (June 23, 2005), available 
at http://www.gilead.ca/wt/sec/pr_723430. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Press Release, Gilead Sciences Inc., Gilead and Roche End Tamiflu® Dispute; 
Expanded Collaboration Includes Gilead Role in Oversight of Manufacturing and 
Commercialization (Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.gilead.com/wt/ 
sec/pr_783456. 
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listed U.S. patents, the latest of which expires in 2017.139  The patent 
rights for Relenza (zanamivir) are licensed to GlaxoSmithKline.140  
The FDA-approved pharmaceutical has five listed U.S. patents, all of 
which expire by 2014.141 
Effective pandemic planning requires the advance buildup of 
antiviral stockpiles that are available in the event of an outbreak.  
HHS has set a goal of keeping enough antivirals on hand for at least 
25 percent of the U.S. population in the event of an influenza pan-
demic outbreak.142  These are kept in the SNS, which the CDC main-
tains.143  States are then assigned allocations of antivirals from the na-
tional stockpile.144 
The chemical synthesis of antivirals requires lead time and mate-
rials.  In view of the synthetic complexity of the drug, Roche has 
stated that it will maintain adequate levels of the chemical interme-
diates necessary for Tamiflu production.145  The demand for private 
 
 139 E.g., Carbocyclic Compounds, U.S. Patent No. 5,763,483 (filed Dec. 27, 1996).  
Representative claims illustrate how a pharmaceutical patent can cover both the 
compound and the methods of clinical treatment: 
     [Claim] 1. A compound of the formula: ##STR74##. . . . [Claim] 4. 
A method of inhibiting the activity of neuraminidase comprising the 
step of contacting a sample suspected of containing neuraminidase 
with a compound of claim 1 or 2. . . . [Claim] 6. A method for the 
treatment or prophylaxis of influenza infection in a host comprising 
administering to the host a therapeutically effective amount of a com-
pound of claim 1 or 2. 
Id. 
 140 See Relenza, available at http://www.biota.com.au/?page=1021002& 
subpage=1021104 (last visited October 7, 2009). 
 141 See, e.g., Derivatives and Analogues of 2-deoxy-2,3-didehydro-N-acetyl Neura-
minic Acid and Their Use as Antiviral Agents, U.S. Patent No. 5,360,817 (filed Nov. 
10, 1992).  Representative claims illustrate the claiming of the antiviral compound 
itself and its pharmaceutical formulations: 
     [Claim] 1. A compound of formula (Ib) ##STR22## . . . . [Claim] 7. 
A pharmaceutical formulation comprising a compound as claimed in 
claim 1 as active ingredient together with a pharmaceutically accepta-
ble carrier therefor. . . . [Claim] 8. A pharmaceutical formulation suit-
able for intranasal administration comprising a compound as claimed 
in claim 1 as active ingredient together with a pharmaceutically accept-
able carrier therefor. 
Id. 
 142 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 54. 
 143 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 65. 
 144 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Antivirals—State Allocations, 
http://pandemicflu.gov/professional/states/antivirals.html (last visited Nov. 18, 
2009). 
 145 Lisa Schnirring, Roche Cuts Tamiflu Production as Demand Cools, CIDRAP NEWS, 
Apr. 26, 2007, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/ 
news/apr2607tamiflu.html. 
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stockpiling of Tamiflu also structures the production decisions of an-
tiviral manufacturers. 
The development of antiviral drugs relevant to treatment of a 
pandemic influenza is likely to precede any pandemic outbreak as a 
result of basic antiviral research, which is consistently concerned with 
increasing the antiviral armamentarium in medical care.146  As dis-
cussed, unlike vaccines, which must be designed to target a specific 
causative virus, an antiviral drug can have a viral protein target which 
appears in many influenza strains, thus making the treatment spec-
trum potentially wide.147  A specific influenza virus, however, may de-
velop resistance to an existing antiviral, and this worrisome develop-
ment has already emerged with the circulating seasonal H1N1 
influenza strain.148  If this resistance is genetically transferred to the 
pandemic H5N1 or novel H1N1, then Tamiflu, for example, may not 
be useful against one of these pandemic virus strains.149  Such a clini-
cal development could render the stockpile capacity ineffective, but 
cannot be predicted in advance.  Stockpiles must be maintained de-
spite the possible emergence of drug resistance. 
Antiviral manufacturing can occur outside the cycles of pandem-
ic emergence, and these drugs do enter the consumer market and 
are potentially available through treating physicians.150  Pandemic 
demand, however, is likely to exceed the supplies in the baseline con-
sumer channels,151 so public health authorities must consider all 
measures that allow antiviral reserve capacity to be established in ad-
vance. 
D. Alleviation of Patent-Related Obstacles to Pharmaceutical 
Availability 
The availability of pharmaceutical countermeasures in an in-
fluenza pandemic, whether vaccines, antivirals, or both, could poten-
tially be constrained by the existence of the patent rights discussed in 
Parts III, A-C.  Such complications can be anticipated and prepared 
for by being aware of the legal mechanisms that recognize critical cir-
cumstances where compulsory access to patented inventions for third 
 
 146 Vincent Racaniello, New Influenza Antiviral Drugs, VIROLOGY BLOG, Jan. 28, 2009, 
http://www.virology.ws/2009/01/28/new-influenza-antiviral-drugs/. 
 147 See supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text. 
 148 See Dharan et al., supra note 83. 
 149  Id. 
 150  See, e.g., Tamiflu, How to Get Prescription Flu Medications, 
http://www.tamiflu.com/getting/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). 
 151  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 7. 
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parties is essential for the provision of supplies in health emergen-
cies.  Recent crises involving other infectious diseases provide models 
for the use of such measures when necessary. 
Establishing full capacity for patented antivirals, if not acceded 
to by voluntary licensing of relevant patents, might rely on the use of 
compulsory licensing measures.152  Unlike vaccines, where manufac-
turing capabilities are currently limited, manufacturing capability for 
antiviral drugs can likely be more easily accommodated by a number 
of pharmaceutical firms, including the roster of established generic 
manufacturers.  The province of public health authorities will be to 
identify where capacity is lacking and to intercede in advance if the 
patent holder cannot provide adequate supplies of antivirals in a 
timely manner.  As in all pandemic management, this is best antic-
ipated ahead of time, due to the time lags in manufacturing and dis-
tribution that could limit the availability of treatment.  Several legal 
mechanisms are available to make patented inventions available for 
use by third parties where the patent holder is unwilling or unable to 
supply critical products in a public health emergency.  Two routes are 
available in U.S. patent law: the use of a compulsory license pursuant 
to federal statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1498153 and the use of 
“march-in” rights to federally funded inventions pursuant to 35 
U.S.C. § 203 (Bayh-Dole Act).154  On an international level, the TRIPS 
treaty provides flexibility for countries to invoke the compulsory li-
censing of patented inventions in a public health emergency.155 
Recent public health crises suggest these mechanisms could be 
effective in an influenza pandemic.  The possibility of a bioterrorism-
related anthrax attack appeared in the U.S. in 2001.156  Anthrax is a 
bacterial infection, not a viral one, but the possibility that an infec-
tious agent would spread quickly through the American population 
elicited a vigorous response from the government and the public 
 
 152 See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL DRUGS AND 
PATENT LAW ISSUES 9–10 (2005), available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/ 
crs/RL33159_051118.pdf. 
 153 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006) gives the federal government the right to use and 
manufacture any patented invention, whether or not it is developed with federal 
funding, and can also authorize third parties to do so, subject to the payment of 
compensation to the patent holder. 
 154 The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006) allows government 
grantees (such as universities) to retain title to their inventions and engage in their 
own efforts to commercialize such technologies. 
 155 See infra notes 171–173 and accompanying text. 
 156 Martin Enserink, This Time It Was Real: Knowledge of Anthrax Put to the Test, 294 
SCIENCE 490, 490 (2001). 
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health community.157  Bayer, Inc., manufactured and held the rele-
vant patents for Cipro, an antibiotic that was identified as the leading 
therapeutic for those exposed to anthrax.158  The possibility that the 
U.S. government might issue a compulsory license under 28 U.S.C. § 
1498 to authorize third-party manufacturing of the leading pharma-
ceutical was very real and represented a significant departure from 
existing reluctance to exercise such power.159  HHS raised the specter 
of the compulsory license because of its concern over the price of Ci-
pro, but did not invoke the provision.160  The price of Cipro was lo-
wered in the U.S. in response to the threat.161 
When the threat of an H5N1 pandemic emerged in 2005, some 
legislators called for a compulsory license under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to 
increase the manufacture of Tamiflu for the treatment of H5N1 when 
it appeared that Roche might not be able to satisfy demand as the 
sole manufacturer.162  Against this backdrop, Roche agreed to license 
several generic manufacturers to make Tamiflu in order to increase 
the stock of antivirals available in the U.S.163 
The challenge of ensuring access to antivirals during major viral 
illness is also illustrated by the prolonged AIDS epidemic, which 
arose in the early 1980s and is now responsible for a global death toll 
that exceeds twenty-five million.164  Patented antivirals targeting HIV 
 
 157 Id. 
 158 Matthew Herper, Cipro, Anthrax and the  Perils of Patents, FORBES.COM, Oct. 17, 
2001, http://www.forbes.com/2001/10/17/1017cipro.html. 
 159 Amy Harmon & Robert Pear, Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat Anthrax, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at A1. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Keith Bradsher, Bayer Halves Price for Cipro, but Rivals Offer Drugs Free, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at A4. 
 162 Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, As Avian Flu Closes in on U.S., 
Schumer Calls for Immediate Action: Demands Suspension of Tamiflu Patent So 
Vaccine Can Be Mass-Produced, Dramatically Increasing Supply (Oct. 16, 2005), 
available at http://schumer.senate.gov/new_website/record.cfm?id=260246. 
 163 Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Praises Agreements with 
Two Major U.S. Generic Drug Companies to Increase Supply of Tamiflu to Help 
Stockpile Against Potential Avian Flu Pandemic (Dec. 8, 2005), available at 
http://schumer.senate.gov/new_website/record_print.cfm?id=260068. 
Roche will continue working with these companies until the bottleneck 
of supply for government stockpiling purposes has been relieved, at 
which point they may regain their status as sole manufacturer. The 
purpose here is not to break the patent on Tamiflu, but rather to meet 
an emergency need for quantities of this drug that Roche itself simply 
cannot do alone. 
Id. 
 164 AVERT, Global HIV/AIDS Estimates, End of 2007, 
http://www.avert.org/worldstats.htm (last visited June 29, 2009). 
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(antiretrovirals known as ARVs) have been developed and effective 
therapeutic regimens have been established; however, there has been 
no express guarantee of treatment in the U.S., for example, and 
access has been even more irregular in poorer countries.165   
The challenge of ensuring access to ARVs for U.S. AIDS patients 
led to attempts to invoke the legal mechanism provided by the Bayh-
Dole Act, the 1980 statute that allowed recipients of federal funds to 
seek patent protection for inventions made with these funds.166  The 
statute allows the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to “march-in” if 
reasonable pricing does not occur, but the unwillingness of the NIH 
to employ this power has been catalogued and criticized.167  In 2004, a 
400 percent increase in the price of the AIDS drug Norvir, manufac-
tured by Abbott, elicited a march-in petition to the NIH, and the NIH 
denied the petition.168  With respect to influenza, should any relevant 
products or methods be determined to result from federally funded 
research, this authority could be petitioned for.  This possibility may 
be more theoretical than real, however.  March-in rights, having been 
dormant through other cycles of demand for access to pharmaceuti-
cals, are not likely to be a fruitful means to alleviate patent-related 
obstacles in the future.  Moreover, a pandemic crisis is likely to be 
addressed with government-funded antivral stockpiles for general dis-
tribution. 
HIV is a global pandemic, and controversies over access to anti-
viral therapeutic ARVs has implicated the patent regimes of many 
countries, all constructed in the shadow of TRIPS, which launched 
international harmonization efforts in 1994.169  The treaty set up a 
schedule for its signatories to establish a patent regime conforming to 
 
 165 See Frederick M. Abbott  & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public 
Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the 
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 927 (2007) (noting divergence in 
the ability of developing and the least-developed countries to obtain essential medi-
cines). 
 166 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).  The Bayh-Dole Act allows government grantees, such 
as universities, to retain title to their inventions and to engage in their own efforts to 
commercialize such technologies.  Id. § 207. 
 167 See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Bio-
medicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 310–11 (2003) (recommending a more vi-
gorous stance by the NIH regarding access to patented biomedical inventions made 
with federal funds); Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? 
Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078, 2081 (2008) (noting history of 
unsuccessful march-in petitions). 
 168 NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, IN THE CASE OF NORVIR 1–7 (2004), available at 
http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/March-in-norvir.pdf (NIH denial of march-in peti-
tion). 
 169 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 165, at 923–27. 
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enacted standards, with delayed starting times for developing and the 
least-developed countries.170  One such mechanism includes Article 31 
of TRIPS, which allows the government to issue compulsory licenses 
for the use of patented inventions in order to serve the public inter-
est.171  Although the treaty itself is a trade-motivated vehicle, it has 
been subject to the efforts of later ministerial conferences to enlarge 
the scope of TRIPS as a means of furthering other social and political 
goals.  The most prominent example of this trend was the adoption 
of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
by the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in 2001.172  
This document elevated attention to public health outcomes as an 
equally animating force for the utilization of TRIPS mechanisms.173  
Concerns over the marginalization of public health issues in the 
TRIPS regime persist, and there are calls to further integrate the 
WHO into the official apparatus of the administering authorities.174 
As the schedule for developing a TRIPS-compliant patent regime 
has been structured for slower adoption by less-developed and the 
least-developed countries, a number of countries with high numbers 
of AIDS cases have yet to offer patent rights on pharmaceutical 
drugs.175  Several countries that have offered patent rights have en-
countered significant price obstacles to the availability of patented 
pharmaceuticals and have sought to invoke some of the flexibility of-
 
 170 Id. at 928. 
 171 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, at 1209, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm. 
 172 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration], availa-
ble at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. 
We recognize that under WTO rules no country should be prevented 
from taking measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life 
or health, or of the environment at the levels it considers appropriate, 
subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised re-
striction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with 
the provisions of the WTO Agreements. 
Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Kelley Lee et al., Bridging the Divide: Global Governance of Trade and Health, 373 
LANCET 416, 420 (2009) (proposing that the WHO be officially integrated within the 
WTO Secretariat). 
 175 Press Release, Int’l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., TRIPS Council 
Agrees on Extensions for LDCs on Pharmaceutical Patents (July 3, 2002), available at 
http://www.ictsd.net/i/ip/39211. 
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fered by TRIPS for public health purposes.176  HIV-related patent dis-
putes are largely responsible for testing and defining the limits of 
TRIPS patent-related flexibility.177  Brazil issued a compulsory license 
for the manufacture of Efavirenz, patented by Merck, and Thailand 
issued a compulsory license for Kaletra, patented by Abbott.178 
With respect to the treatment of influenza, Taiwan invoked a 
compulsory license to use the Roche patent on Tamiflu under TRIPS 
Article 31 in 2005, as fears of a global H5N1 pandemic were spread-
ing.179  Following this action, Roche voluntarily licensed the relevant 
patent rights to generic manufacturers in developing countries, such 
as China and India.180  This precedent is likely to encourage the actual 
or threatened use of compulsory licenses by national governments as 
soon as need is identified in any subsequent influenza pandemics. 
Clearly, the issuance of a compulsory license to generate antivir-
al stockpile capacity can be invoked as a public health measure in 
view of the fact that post-pandemic production will not meet demand 
because the drug must be available at the first signs of an outbreak.  
Therefore, capacity cannot be the function of market forces respond-
ing only to existing medical crises or the function of stockpile capa-
bilities established in wealthier countries.  Government authorities 
must establish capacity either by direct purchase from the manufac-
turer or through other mechanisms.  Antiviral drugs that are under 
patent in a particular country could be subject to a TRIPS-compliant 
compulsory license which authorizes third-party manufacturing for 
domestic consumption, likely at government expense.181 
The precedents set by the HIV epidemic and the anthrax out-
break are highly relevant to the use of compulsory licenses in pan-
demic crisis.  However, concerns over the emergence of an H5N1 
pandemic in 2005 have already activated demands for the domestic 
 
 176 Debate continues over the scope of TRIPS flexibility for public health purpos-
es; this flexibility has been limited by bilateral trade treaties.  See Cynthia Ho, Current 
Controversies Concerning Patent Rights and Public Health in a World of International Norms, 
in PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 673, 685–95 
(Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2009) (discussing the permissible scope of compulsory li-
censes issued under Article 31). 
 177 See Cynthia Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health, 
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1469, 1484–89 (2007) (detailing the use of TRIPS-authorized 
legal mechanisms to ease patent-related barriers to pharmaceutical availability). 
 178 Id. at 1485–88. 
 179 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 165, at 948. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See supra notes 171–173.  The pending Article 31bis would allow a compulsory 
license to issue for domestic manufacturing capacity that is used to export to non-
producing countries.  Abbott & Reichman, supra note 165, at 929. 
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use of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, where necessary, and the actual use of the 
TRIPS Article 31 flexibility in Taiwan.182  These events, which grew 
from H5N1 pandemic concerns, will also serve as a caution for patent 
holders controlling future access to critical pandemic supplies, 
whether related to vaccines or antivirals, alerting them to incorporate 
public interest considerations when making decisions regarding their 
patented properties. 
Although most examples of compulsory licensing to patented in-
ventions during infectious disease crises have involved the provision 
of antiviral or antibacterial pharmaceuticals, the overarching legal 
principles are applicable to circumstances where materials or me-
thods required for either vaccine or antiviral administration become 
limited by patent-related obstacles.  Thus, public health authorities 
should be aware that, despite the patenting of input materials (e.g., 
viral genetic sequences) or output products (e.g., vaccine formula-
tion) as well as any production or treatment methods, any unreason-
able prohibitions on the availability of such patented inventions can 
be countered using the legal measures described above. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The magnitude of a twenty-first century influenza pandemic 
cannot be determined with certainty; however, the outlines of con-
tainment strategies are very clear and amenable to anticipatory de-
velopment in order to optimize responses.  There is no shortage of 
government planning documents and organizations, both global and 
national, that can facilitate the organization and availability of per-
sonnel, supplies, and communications during a pandemic.  Although 
most planning efforts to date have contemplated the emergence of 
an H5N1 influenza pandemic, public health authorities were able to 
rely on their broad outlines when the unexpected novel H1N1 in-
fluenza pandemic emerged earlier this year.  As the world has 
learned from both the HIV and SARS epidemics, effective interna-
tional cooperation is a necessary condition to reducing the burden of 
global infectious disease. 
This Article has outlined how and where patenting scientific ma-
terials, technical methods, and pharmaceutical products can occur in 
the development of pharmaceutical countermeasures for prevention 
and treatment in an influenza pandemic.  How do patents influence 
development, capacity, and access?  Three key nodes of patenting 
emerge from the discussion: patents may control access to virus DNA 
 
 182 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 165, at 948. 
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sequences and proteins, to vaccine production methods and actual 
vaccines, and to antiviral drugs that treat existing infections.  A key 
differentiation between the impact of patents on vaccines and anti-
virals during an influenza pandemic emerges: patents can affect vac-
cine development, and subsequent capacity and access, but patents 
will affect antivirals only at the level of capacity and access, as their 
development will have occurred prior to a pandemic outbreak. 
Despite the foreknowledge that pandemic planners bring to 
bear if confronted with a pandemic crisis, an emerging infectious 
outbreak will still present scientists and official authorities with a pre-
dictable set of unknowns that specifically relate to the particular mi-
croorganism responsible for the pandemic.  In an influenza pandem-
ic, the causative virus must be isolated and analyzed with allowance 
for any regional or population variations.  The medical community 
will optimally want to deploy the pharmaceutical interventions of an-
tivirals and vaccines.  Several genetic realities will determine how 
those modalities are deployed.  The pandemic viral strain must be 
identified and analyzed, requiring a full molecular analysis in order 
to generate a viral genome and specific gene sequences.  Effective 
vaccine design requires scientific consensus regarding the virus cho-
sen for vaccine development, followed by clinical testing to deter-
mine an immunogenic composition and a dose regimen that will 
provide effective immunization. The viral strain must also be tested 
for its susceptibility to existing antiviral agents in order to identify 
which antivirals should be disseminated.  The possibility exists that a 
pandemic viral strain has resistance to one or more antivirals, in 
which case the range of interventions may be severely curtailed, pos-
sibly shifting the bulk of the medical response to the development of 
vaccines. 
Patents may stimulate the development of a pharmaceutical, 
e.g., the research and development necessary for successful produc-
tion of an antiviral drug, but the same patented antiviral may be sub-
ject to the exclusive control of its patent owner, who is able to extract 
maximal financial benefit from its position.  In the case of pandemic 
planning, two realities are evident.  Advance capacity of any relevant 
antiviral drug is required and access for infected individuals needs to 
be widely available in order to achieve community-wide containment 
of the infectious disease.  A difficulty in pandemic planning is that 
building advance capacity will depend on government ordering and 
purchase, and maximal capacity will still be constrained by the ability 
of a patent holder to control manufacture and distribution of the 
drug.  The 2001 anthrax crisis in the U.S. raised the specter of gov-
ernment exercise of its plenary right under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to allow 
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third-party use of a patented invention, but this scenario unfolded 
during the actual public health crisis. 
In an influenza pandemic, the kinetics of infectious disease and 
the realities of pharmaceutical production dictate several advance 
considerations.  Building effective capacity could exceed the produc-
tion capabilities or allowances of a patent holder, and the govern-
ment may have to consider using a compulsory license to achieve 
adequate production, using third-party manufacturers and fully com-
pensating the patent holder.  But production planning must occur 
with knowledge of the production schedule for an antiviral drug.  
The actual synthetic processes can take months and thus prevent 
manufacture of instantaneous capacity.  Therefore, pandemic plan-
ners must include patent-dictated limitations on production capacity 
and time constraints in pharmaceutical production when designing 
how adequate supplies of an antiviral drug will be procured in a rele-
vant time period.  This Article has discussed how pandemic planning 
requires the establishment of capacity following development in or-
der to ensure access.  One advantage of the reliance on public sector 
establishment of capacity is that access is then controlled by public 
health authorities who can distribute a drug without charge.  The 
challenge of access, therefore, could turn on the official prioritization 
of access (e.g., first responders, medical personnel) rather than the 
usual market-mediated mechanisms that provide access as a function 
of price and financial ability. 
If surplus manufacturing capability exists, the use of other com-
pulsory licensing approaches is possible when considering the cir-
cumvention of patent-mediated limitations on pharmaceutical pro-
duction.  The theoretical use of the march-in rights afforded by the 
Bayh-Dole Act is a possibility for inventions resulting from the use of 
federal funds, even though this mechanism has not been successful to 
date.  Furthermore, the TRIPS-structured design of national patent 
regimes includes the possible use of the flexibility afforded by Article 
31 of the treaty, which recognizes circumstances where governments 
may properly invoke compulsory licenses of patented inventions in 
order to serve the national interest, i.e., the maintenance of public 
health.  Such mechanisms have been used to increase access to the 
antiviral drugs required for treating HIV infection. 
How can patent realities be recognized in pandemic planning?  
Consider the integration of compulsory licensing measures into the 
scope of legal powers that could be required in a public health emer-
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gency.183  In addition, when discussing official pandemic planning in 
order to ensure that vaccines and antivirals are available, consider 
where patented knowledge could impact pharmaceutical develop-
ment and where patented products could impact availability.184  For 
example, it is known now that patented methods for vaccine produc-
tion will be required for use during a pandemic, and prospective li-
censing arrangements can be outlined in advance both to minimize 
transaction time and to determine reasonable terms.  Because pan-
demic vaccine production essentially relies on the same infrastructure 
as that used for a seasonal influenza vaccine, all of the fundamental 
materials and methods are known in advance to pandemic planners.  
The crisis itself will simply supply the actual antigen or virus as the 
key vaccine component.  Hence, patents affecting the availability of a 
virus protein or a whole isolated virus will be key determinants of 
whether a vaccine can be rapidly produced.  This Article discussed 
why the patenting of influenza viruses may not surface as a potential 
barrier, but this could be due to community norms rather than any 
prohibition on obtaining such patents.  Thus, pandemic planners 
must be vigilant regarding any patenting of the key viruses and their 
components. 
There is no doubt that recent infectious diseases with global 
spread, such as HIV and SARS, have accelerated the coordination of 
international public health efforts, including the establishment of the 
International Health Regulations by the WHO in 2005.  A further 
welcome development is the WHO’s recent recognition of the need 
to integrate the management of intellectual property issues into in-
ternational efforts to ensure the availability of pharmaceuticals for in-
fectious and other diseases.  Further integration would be enhanced 
by the increased participation of the WHO and/or public health au-
thorities as stakeholders in discussions on the intellectual proper-
ty/trade treaty interface. 
The ability to offer pharmaceutical interventions for an influen-
za pandemic depends on three factors: development, capacity, and 
access. Pharmaceutical measures must be developed, capacity must be 
established, and access must be ensured.  Patents intersect with these 
requirements in pandemic planning, and this Article has discussed 
 
 183 See generally KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE 2009 
INFLUENZA A(H1N1) OUTBREAK: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES (2009) (focusing only on lia-
bility and civil rights issues attendant to providing vaccines and antivirals). 
 184 Such issues are notably absent in such U.S. planning documents and reviews.  
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, (lacking any discussion of 
patent-related issues related to the provision of vaccines and antivirals). 
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where they may surface and how any obstacles may be managed.  The 
central role of public health authorities in an influenza pandemic al-
ters some of the traditional trajectories for the development of criti-
cal pharmaceutical interventions, but official planning must still ac-
count for the presence of patented materials and methods.  As public 
health planners continue to deepen their awareness of the patent 
realities that mediate access to pharmaceuticals—a development has-
tened by the demands of infectious disease outbreaks—the prospects 
improve for a more comprehensive analysis of patents and their role 
in public health.  Pandemic urgencies are likely to deepen the impa-
tience with any unnecessary obstacles that patenting may pose to the 
provision of critical medical supplies, including pharmaceuticals.  
The establishment of international clinical equality during public 
health emergencies is essential and can provide a template for more 
permanent efforts to achieve health equity for all diseases. 
 
